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AN INQUIRY INTO THE UTILITY OF
"DOMICILE" AS A CONCEPT IN
CONFLICTS ANALYSIS
Russell]. Weintraub*

N

o attempt is made here to conduct an exhaustive case study
of any one particular area in which the concept of "domicile"
is used as a tool for analysis in the conflict of laws. A number of
thorough and useful studies have been made in narrow areas1
and are cited at appropriate places in the body of this article. Instead,
this article will review the use of "domicile" in analyzing certain
typical conflicts problems, particularly its use as the contact or
pointing word in choice of law rules concerning the testate and
intestate distribution of movables, and, as is newly the fashion, its
use when determining the capacity of a wife to sue her husband in
tort. "Domicile" as a basis for judicial jurisdiction will also be dealt
with briefly. But, except for divorce jurisdiction, jurisdiction to
deal with status will be skirted since such problems are enormously
complex and require separate treatment. The purpose of this wideranging overview is to appraise the utility of the concept of
"domicile" as a tool for conflicts analysis. Several well-known cases
have been selected for examination. A review of those cases and
the analytical problems they present should allow some conclusions
to be drawn regarding whether domicile is a useful concept which
assists proper analysis or is an albatross around our necks that we
would be better to be quit of.
I.

INTESTATE SUCCESSION TO MOVABLES

In other areas of choice of law, the second Restatement of
Conflict of Laws has departed dramatically from the rules of the
first Restatement. This is true, for example, in the substitution of
"the state with which the contract has its most significant relationship"2 for "the place of contracting"3 and in the substitution of "the
• Professor of Law, University of Texas; Visiting Professor of Law, University of
Michigan.-Ed.
1. See particularly Stimson, Conflict of Laws and the Administration of Decedents'
Personal Property, 46 VA. L. REv. 1345 (1960); Yiannopoulos, Wills of Movables in
American International Conflicts Law-A Critique of the Domiciliary "Rule," 46
CALIF. L. REv. 185 (1958) (survey of all cases to date of article involving international
contacts).
2. REsl'ATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLicr OF LAws § 332 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1960).
3. REsTATEMENT, .CoNFLicr OF LAws § 332 (1934).
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state which has the most significant relationship with the occurrence
and with the parties" 4 for "law of the place of wrong." 11 These
changes are already having salutary effects upon our courts. 6
Insofar as intestate succession to movables is concerned, however, the new Restatement is content to parrot the "law of the state
of his domicil" 7 language of the first Restatement, but with a new
renvoi twist. The new black-letter rule reads as follows:
"(l) Questions of intestate succession to interests in chattels or
in rights embodied in a document are determined by the law
of the state where the decedent was domiciled at the time of his
death, unless the law of the state in which the chattel or
document is situated is to the contrary."
"(2) Questions of intestate succession to rights not embodied
in a document are determined by the law of the state where
the decedent was domiciled at the time of his death.'' 8
In the case of chattels and rights embodied in a document,
reference to the whole law of the situs is explained by the fact that
the situs has control over such movables, 0 the undoubted power to
administer such assets in the event of intestacy,10 and probably the
power to apply its own law on distribution should it wish to do
so. 11 This accords with the common explanation of the supposed12
standard choice of law reference to the law of the domicile at death
for intestate distribution of personalty as a preliminary reference
to the whole law of the situs and then a referral by its choice of law
rule to the law of the domicile at death. 13 Moreover, in the new
4. REsTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLicr OF LAws § 379 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963).
5. REsTATEMENT, CONFLicr OF LAws § 379 (1934).
6. For cases abandoning the "place of wrong" rule under tbe influence of the
second Restatement, see, e.g., Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 191
N.E.2d 279 (1963); Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc,, 416 Pa. I, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
7. REsTATEMENT, CONFLicr OF LAws § 303 (1934).
8. REsTATEMENT (SECOND), CoNFLicr OF LAws § 303 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1959).
9. Id. § 303, comment b.
10. See Iowa v. Slimmer, 248 U.S. 115 (1918); Newcomb v. Newcomb, 108 Ky. 582,
57 S.W. 2 (1900) (power to probate will at situs); Stimson, supra note 1, at 1352.
11. See Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18, 22 (1891) (dictum);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 467 (1942) (personal property situated in Mississippi to be distributed according to Mississippi law); Stimson, supra note 1, at 1380.
12. Some commentators have found substantial evidence tbat the situs law is being
applied. See, e.g., Stimson, supra note 1, at 1345, 1380.
13. ROBERTSON, CHARACTERIZATION IN THE CONFLicr OF LAws 208 (1940); STUMBERG,
CoNFLicr OF LAws 374 (3d ed. 1963); Briggs, "Renvoi" in the Succession to TangiblesA False Issue Based on Faulty Analysis, 64 YALE L.J. 195, 197 (1954); Griswold, Renvoi
Revisited, 51 HARV. L. REv. 1165, 1194 (1938).
Some support for this view is claimed from the fact that esclieat is to the situs. See
Matter of Menscliefrend's Estate, 283 App. Div. 463, 128 N.Y.S.2d 738 (1954), a[J'd mem.,
8 N.Y.2d 1092, 208 N.Y.S.2d 453, 170 N.E.2d 902, remittitur amended, 8 N.Y.2d 1156,
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Restatement version, the reference to the law of the domicile, either
directly or by way of the whole law of the situs, is again to the
whole law of the domicile including its conflicts rules.14 This is
to insure that all courts referring to the law of the domicile will
in fact distribute the property as the courts of the domicile would
under identical facts. 15
In this age of non-music and non-books, it is probably fitting
that we should have such a non-rule. A purported choice of law rule
which refers to the whole law of the indicated jurisdiction is not
a choice of law rule at all. It gives no real guidance as to which
domestic law of all those which might be applied is in fact the
most appropriate. It gives no guidance to the courts of the jurisdiction to whose whole law other courts are directed16-no guidance,
that is, to the most probable forum. There is a distinction between
what a forum has the power to do and what it ought to do, 17 and
the purpose of choice of law rules is to tell it what it ought to do in
selecting applicable law.
On the whole, however, the expectation of the second Restatement, as of the first, seems to be that the internal law of the domicile
at death will ultimately be applied to intestate distribution and that
this is proper. 18 Except for the insertion of the renvoi concept and
the rather sensible recognition of the fact that the meaning of
"domicile" must vary with the context19 (about which more will
209 N.Y.S.2d 836, 171 N.E.2d 909, cert. denied sub nom. Brown v. Lefkowitz, 365 U.S.
842 (1960); In re Barnett's Trusts, [1902] I Ch. 847; REsTATEMENT (SECOND), CoNFLicr
OF LAws § 309 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1959). There is, however, some authority to the
contrary. See Estate of •Nolan, 135 Cal. App. 2d 16, 286 P.2d 899 (Dist. Ct. App. 1955)
(bank accounts); California v. Tax Comm'n, 55 Wash. 2d 155, 346 P.2d 1006 (1959)
(stock in local corporation, certificates at domicile); In re Lyons' Estate, 175 Wash. 115,
26 P.2d 615 (1933) (bank account). There is even some authority that escheat will not
be to the situs if the law of the domicile treats the domiciliary government as an heir
for purposes of escheat. See In re Estate of Utassi, 29 Misc. 2d 387, 217 N.Y.S.2d 389
(Surr. Ct. 1961), afl'd mem., 20 App. Div. 2d 232, 246 N.Y.S.2d 478 (1964); Re Maldonado,
[1953] 2 All E.R. 1579 (Ct. App.). For criticism of this latter trend, see Ehrenzweig,
Characterization in the Conflict of Laws-An Unwelcome Addition to American
Doctrine, in XXrn CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTS LAws 395, 403 (1961).
14. R.EsrATEMENT (SECOND), CoNFLicr OF LAWS § 303, comment c (Tent. Draft No.
5, 1959).
15. Ibid.
16. See COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAws 264 (1942).
17. But see Baker, In the Administration of Intangibles-Missouri's Section 466.010
in Perspective, 19 Mo. L. REv. I, 15 (1954): "Not always have courts clearly distinguished between the propriety of administering at the situs, and the propriety of
applying in that administration the succession law of the domicile."
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAws § 303, comment c (Tent. Draft No.
5, 1959).
19. Id. § 11, comment d (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954).
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be said later),20 the approach of the new Restatement to the
problem is basically the same as that of the old. It might be well
therefore to scrutinize the "law of the domicile" choice of law rule
for intestate succession and to begin by reviewing some of the
classic cases applying that rule.

A. In re Estate of ]ones21
I. Facts

Evan Jones, a native of Wales, had come to America in 1883
because of bastardy proceedings instituted against him by the
mother of his illegitimate daughter. He became a naturalized
citizen and married here, but his wife predeceased him. Being
thrifty and hard-working, he had accumulated a considerable amount
of property in Iowa, where he had settled. In 1915, having decided
to return to his native Wales to live out the rest of his days, he sold
his realty, purchased a draft for about two thousand dollars, left the
rest of his cash on deposit in an Iowa bank with a note and mortgage
for collection, sailed on the Lusitania, and was drowned when that
ship was sunk by a German submarine.
The contestants for the intestate property in Iowa were, on one
side, Evan's brothers and sisters and, on the other, his illegitimate
daughter. Under Iowa law, because her paternity had been sufficiently proved and recognized during Evan's lifetime,22 the daughter
would inherit all assets administered in Iowa.23 Under British law,
however, it was conceded that the intestate distribution would
be entirely to the decedent's brothers and sisters'. It was therefore
crucial to decide whether Iowa law or British law controlled the
intestate distribution.

2. Decision
The court took as its guide the choice of law rule that the law
of the decedent's domicile at death governed the intestate distribution of his movables. The only issue, then, was whether Evan
Jones was domiciled in Iowa or in the British Isles at the time of
his death. The argument for domicile in Great Britain was based
on the English doctrine of reverter of the domicile of origin as soon
20. See text accompanying notes 85-96 infra.
21. 192 Iowa 78, 182 N.W. 227 (1921).
22. IOWA CODE ANN. § 3385 (1897).
23. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 3362, 3378 (1897).
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as the domicile of choice is abandoned: 24 Evan had acquired a
domicile of choice in Iowa, but as soon as he left Iowa intending
to return to his domicile of origin, Wales, his domicile of origin was
renewed. This argument was rejected by the court which viewed
it as based on feelings of patriotism and ties to the mother country
that might exist when a British subject went to some distant part
of the Commonwealth to make his fortune, always regarding himself
as an Englishman. The court thought such notions inapplicable to
a naturalized American citizen. Once this doctrine was rejected,
it was clear that Evan was technically domiciled at death in Iowa.
He had acquired a domicile of choice in Iowa and would retain it
until he was physically present in another jurisdiction concurrent
with a present intention to make the other jurisdiction his home.
Therefore, he died domiciled in Iowa, Iowa law controlled intestate
distribution of his property, and all intestate property went to the
daughter.
3. Analysis
In testing the soundness of a decision such as this, it is often
helpful to put oneself in the position of an advocate for the losing
side and thus to see what reasonable arguments could be advanced
for an opposite result. First, the Iowa court misinterpreted the
English rule on revival of the domicile of origin, since the rule
was applicable not only when a domicile of choice was abandoned
to return to the domicile of origin but also whenever a domicile of
choice was abandoned until a new domicile of choice was established. 25 Further, the rule was not based solely on notions of
patriotism and ties to mother England. The domicile of origin
reverted because of its special nature; one acquired his domicile
of origin by operation of law as the domicile of his parents at his
birth. When, therefore, a person had left his domicile of choice
intending never to return and it seemed unrealistic to say that he
retained a domicile there, the domicile of origin which he had
originally acquired by operation of law would renew, again by operation of law, until it was once more sensible to speak of a domicile
of choice elsewhere.26 It seems very unlikely, however, that a
24. See Udny v. Udny, L.R. 1 H.L. 441 (1869). For a report on a proposal to
abandon the rule in England, see Graveson, Reform of the Law of Domicile, 70 L.Q.
R.Ev. 492, 496, 498-99 (1954).
25. Udny v. Udny, supra note 24, at 448, 454, 460-61.
26. Id. at 452, 458-60.
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correct understanding of the English rule on revival of domicile of
origin would have changed the result.
Playing the domicile game with the court, one is tempted to
expose the fallacy latent in the statement that "all will agree that
the decedent did not have a domicile on the Lusitania."21 For the
purpose of the choice of law rule in issue, it was necessary only to
decide whether Evan had died domiciled somewhere in the British
Isles since Wales has no intestacy law of its own. He could have died
domiciled in Great Britain without having died domiciled in Wales.28
As soon as he set foot anyplace on British territory, he would be
physically present in the jurisdiction whose law was in issue with
a present intention to make his home somewhere within that
territory. The Lusitania was a ship of the Cunard Line flying the
British flag, and in the event of a tort on the high seas, the old,
standard choice of law rule would have chosen the law of the flag
to govern.29 Since the Lusitania was a little piece of Britain and
Evan Jones was therefore on British territory with domiciliary
intent before he died, he died domiciled in Great Britain, and its
law, not Iowa law, should have been applied.
Thus to play the domicile game exposes its inherent silliness.
Why should the result turn on whether Evan managed to set foot
on British territory again before his death or whether he retained
a technical domicile in Iowa? What reasons can be advanced for
having domicile at death govern the intestate distribution of
movables and are these reasons applicable in the context of this
case? Let us turn to these questions, which seem to go to the heart of
the matter.
The reason most often advanced in support of the rule that the
law of the domicile at death governs distribution of movables on
intestacy (frequently the only reason advanced) is that it insures
uniformity of distribution.80 It is desirable, in order that confusion
and conflict may be avoided, that the same law govern distribution
of movable property everywhere; but this argument does not support
any particular conflicts rule. Uniform interpretation and application
of any choice of law rule will produce the desired result.
27. 192 Iowa 78, 83, 182 N.W. 227, 229 (1921).
28. REsTATEMENT (SECOND}, CONFLICT OF LA.ws § 11, comment e (Tent. Draft No.
2, 1954).
29. REsTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LA.ws § 406 (1934).
30. REsTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LA.ws § 303, comment c (Tent. Draft No.
5, 1959); STUMBERG, op. dt. supra note 13, at 374; Reese, Conflict of Laws and the
Restatement Second, 28 LAW 8: CONTEMP. PROB. 679, 687 (1963).
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Another reason frequently given for the domiciliary rule in
intestacy and stated by the court in the principal case31 is that the
decedent is presumably more familiar with the law of his domicile
than that of any other jurisdiction and, having left no will, wishes
his property to pass in accordance with that domiciliary law. This
seems unrealistic in the extreme. One may speculate with amusement over what responses the inquiring reporter would have if he
asked people whether they knew the intestacy laws of their home
state and wished those laws to govern distribution of their property.
But, even conceding the possible validity of this as a general proposition, was it proper to presume that Evan Jones wished his bastard
daughter to inherit all of his property? He seems to have made a
life-long project of avoiding any responsibility for her support, and
the court itself admitted that, so far as Evan's intentions were
concerned, there was no basis for choosing Iowa or British law.32
A reason for applying the domiciliary rule in intestacy cases
that is far more satisfactory than either of those usually given would
seem to be that the technical domicile at death is likely, in the great
majority of cases, to be in fact the jurisdiction which has the sole
or at least the predominant interest in the application of its intestacy
laws to the property of the decedent. Whatever be the policies
underlying a state's intestacy statute directing which of the surviving
kin shall take and in what portions, the chances are that the technical
domicile at death will have a real and legitimate interest in wanting
its own policies in these matters enforced. The natural objects of the
decedent's bounty, or a good portion of them, are likely to be
residents of the place of his domicile at death. If hard feelings are
caused by a distribution improper in the eyes of the domicile, it is
the domestic peace and tranquility of the domicile which will suffer.
If those dependent upon the decedent are not given a share the
domicile state considers just and proper and become objects of public
charity, the government and citizens of that state will pay the bill.
If this is the reason which might most reasonably be advanced
for the rule selecting the law of the domicile at death to govern
intestate distribution of movables, is it applicable on the facts of
In re Estate of Jones? A little searching of the record will reveal
that all of the contestants, the illegitimate daughter and the brothers
and sisters of the decedent, were residents of the British Isles at the
time of his death and, with the exception of one sister who had
31. 192 Iowa at 95, 182 N.W. at 234.
32. Ibid.
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sojourned briefly in the United States, had been life-long residents
of Great Britain. 33 Iowa had no interest in preferring the bastard
daughter over the brothers and sisters when British law would not
have done so.

B. White v. Tennant 34

I. Facts
The same basic objection can be made to the result in White v.
Tennant. Michael White, at least until less than a month before his
death, had been a life-long domiciliary of West Virginia, where his
wife and brothers and sisters were also domiciled. Michael owned a
farm in West Virginia on which he was living with his wife. He sold
the farm and reached an agreement with his mother and brothers
and sisters to occupy a forty-acre tract and a house on that tract. The
tract was situated in Pennsylvania, just across the state line from
West Virginia. This forty-acre tract was part of a larger 240-acre
farm, the main part of which, including the mansion-house, was
in West Virginia. On the morning of April 2, 1885, Michael and
his wife left the West Virginia farm and house which he had sold
and started for the house on the family farm in Pennsylvania "with
the declared intent and purpose of making the Pennsylvania house
his home that evening." 35 Michael and his wife arrived at the
Pennsylvania house about sundown. The previous tenants had left
several days before and the house was damp and uncomfortable.
Michael's wife complained of feeling ill. Under the circumstances,
Michael accepted the invitation of his brothers and sisters to spend
the night in the mansion-house in West Virginia. He paused long
enough to place in the Pennsylvania house the household goods he
had carried with him and to tum loose his livestock. As it happened,
Michael never did return to the Pennsylvania house to live. His
wife, it was soon learned, had typhoid fever, and he stayed at the
mansion-house to care for her. For about two weeks he went daily to
the Pennsylvania tract to care for his stock, then suffered an attack
33. The residences of the contestants are indicated in the record in the following
places and are Wales unless otherwise designated. Illegitimate daughter-Margaret,
appellant's abstract of record, p. 2. Brothers and sisters-William, appellees' amendment to abstract, p. 128; Rees (London), appellant's abstract of record, p. 11; Thomas,
same abstract, p. 114; Sarah Williams (had lived in United States but returned to
Wales), same abstract, pp. 114-15; Mary, appellees' amendment to abstract, p. 131;
John, same abstract, p. 129; Elizabeth Davies, same abstract, p. 130.
34. 31 W. Va. 790, 8 S.E. 596 (1888).
35. Id. at 794, 8 S.E. at 598.
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of typhoid fever himself, and, a short time later, died intestate in
the West Virginia mansion-house.

2. Decision
A good deal depended upon whether "\\Test Virginia law or Pennsylvania law was applied to the intestate distribution of Michael's
personal property. Under West Virginia law everything would go
to his widow. 38 The Pennsylvania statute gave half to the widow
and half to the brothers and sisters.37 Using the domicile at death
rule, the West Virginia court ordered distribution under the
Pennsylvania intestacy statute. It reasoned that Michael had been
physically present at his house in Pennsylvania with a concurrent
present intent to make it his home. Though he was present for only
a short time, even momentary physical presence88 if coupled with the
requisite domiciliary intention89 would be sufficient. Therefore, he
had acquired a domicile of choice in Pennsylvania.

3. Analysis
Again, if one wishes to play the domiciliary game with the court
and to argue for application of West Virginia law, it would first be
necessary to point out the fallacy in one of the arguments the
court used to establish the existence of a domicile of choice in
Pennsylvania. The court reasoned40 that Michael had to have a
domicile somewhere at all times. He did not have one in the house
he had sold and vacated, and he did not have one in the mansionhouse in West Virginia because he did not think of it as a home.
Therefore, he must have been domiciled in the Pennsylvania house.
There is, of course, another possibility. He could have died domiciled in the State of West Virginia, though not in any house in
that state.41 This is what would necessarily have been the result
had he suffered a fatal heart attack on the trip to Pennsylvania
before crossing the state line but after leaving his West Virginia
!16. w. VA. CODE ch. 78, § 9 (1899).
!17. Pa. P.L. !115, § I (18!1!1).
!18. REsTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAws § 15(!1) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954).
!19. Id. § 18: "To acquire a domicile of choice in a place, a person must intend,
for the time at least, to make that place his home." This is a modem updating of
the "indefinite time" test traditionally used by American courts and used in the
principal case.
40. !11 W. Va. at 797, 8 S.E. at 599-600.
41. See note 28 supra.
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house and, let us assume, after it had been occupied by the new
tenants. Having pointed this out, the argument in support of the
widow should concentrate on the mental element part of the physicalpresence-plus-domiciliary-intention combination needed to acquire
a domicile of choice. The argument would be that before he had
reached Pennsylvania on April 2, in view of his wife's complaints
of illness, he had already decided to stay in West Virginia at the
mansion-house that night and thus his domiciliary intention was
but a future intention and not the required present intention.
To be sure, the court specifically found that his intention to remain
was a present one upon his arrival,42 but this finding may have been
changed by cogent evidence to the contrary.
Is all this, however, not beside the point? It is a common ploy for
Conflicts teachers when discussing this case in class to ask whether
the result would have been the same if the ultimate issue had been
whether West Virginia or Pennsylvania could levy a large inheritance
tax on, let us imagine, several million dollars of intangible personalty
in Michael's estate. 43 The purpose of such a question may be to
prepare the class for the startling revelation that "domicile" may
mean different things in different contexts. Perhaps, however, there
is another reason why the result might be different. Such an issue
would focus the West Virginia court's attention on a matter which
it did not seem to note in White v. Tennant-West Virginia's
substantial interest in the outcome of the litigation. In the principal
case, since all the contestants had been long-time West Virginia
residents, one can ask what legitimate interest Pennsylvania had in
controlling the intestate distribution as between the siblings and
widow of Michael White. In view of the possible policies underlying
an intestate distribution statute, perhaps Pennsylvania had no interest. Michael certainly was not more familiar with the Pennsylvania
law on the subject than he was with West Virginia law. West Virginia
had the predominant, perhaps exclusive, interest in preventing discord among the contestants and treating them according to its own
notions of fairness and their needs. Although there is no indication
of where the widow settled after the death of her husband, presumably it was in West Virginia; but it would be foolish to let much
42. 31 W. Va. at 796, 8 S.E. at 599.
43. Cf. Reese, Does Domicil Bear a· Single .Meaning?, 55 CoLUM. L. REv. 589, 593
(1955) (puts hypothetical similar to White v. Tennant with inheritance tax issue and
suggests courts would fail to find requisite domiciliary intention toward new state).
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tum upon that. We would not want the widow to be able to select
the law to govern distribution by selecting her house.44

C. A More Useful Tool for Rational Analysis

In order to point up the relative interests of West Virginia and
Pennsylvania in the White case and to argue in terms of the policies
underlying the statutes on intestate distribution, one might approach
the problem as one of statutory construction. The statutes speak
of "decedents," "intestates," "widows" and "kindred," but what
decedents, what intestates, what widows and next of kin? If, as
one might expect, the statutes of the two states are innocent of
any answers to these questions in the interstate context of a conflicts
problem, an answer must be supplied by statutory construction. The
basic technique of such construction is to inquire into the purposes
of the statutes to determine which of several possible constructions would advance these purposes and which would not. Unfortunately for such an approach, the Pennsylvania legislature had succumbed to the domicile dogma and a section of its code read,
"Nothing in this act contained, relative to a distribution of personal
estate among kindred, shall be construed to extend to the personal
estate of an intestate, whose domicile, at the time of his death, was
out of this commonwealth."46 There was, however, no such embarrassment to rational analysis in the West Virginia code for the
West Virginia forum. A code section such as this serves to buttress
the argument against attempts to deal with conflict problems by
statute-at least in the present state of our maturity respecting
choice of law analysis. If not based upon an analysis of the policies
underlying the statute and their relevance to extrastate contacts,
such enactments are likely to generate spurious conflicts, resulting
in the application of the law of a state having no legitimate interest
in the matter and defeating the relevant interest of another state.
If such enactments are based on the analysis of policies and seek to
advance the interest of the enacting state whenever its policies are
relevant, they will stifle any attempts at rational solutions to true
conflicts.
In view of the possible policies underlying a statutory scheme
44. But cf. Gore v. Northeast Airlines, 222 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (widow's
move from New York after husband's death makes New York law inapplicable).
45. Pa. P .L. 315, § 20 (1833).
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of intestate distribution, if we must have a choice of law rule in
this area as a shorthand for proper analysis, we would do well to
fashion a judge-made rule which by its very terms takes specific
account of those policies. Instead of talking in terms of technical
domicile at death, it would be preferable to speak of "the state with
the paramount interest in the distribution of the intestate movables." This may be, perhaps usually will be, the technical domicile
at death. But, when it is not, we should have the tools at hand to
recognize this.
II.

VALIDITY OF A WILL DISPOSING OF MOVABLES

The second Restatement adopts the same formula for determining the validity of a will of movables as it does for intestate succession, with the same double renvoi footwork:
"(l) The validity and effect of a will in so far as it affects
interests in chattels or in rights embodied in a document are
determined by the law of the state where the testator was
domiciled at the time of his death, unless the law of the state
in which a chattel or document is situated is to the contrary.
(2) The validity and effect of a will in so far as it affects rights
not embodied in a document are determined by the law of
the state where the testator was domiciled at the time of his
death." 46
Thus is approved for continued use the supposed47 standard
choice of law rule looking to the domicile of the testator at death.
Again, we might begin by reviewing a classic case.
46. REsTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAws § 306 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1959).
47. There is some doubt about the universality of the rule. Alternative references
are sometimes made, frequently to the situs law, in order to uphold the will. See
In re Chappell's Estate, 124 Wash, 128, 213 Pac. 684 (1923) (situs law applied to uphold
testamentary trust as against accumulations rule of domicile); ILL. R.Ev. STAT. ch. 3,
§ 89b (1961) (nonresident testator may provide in will for application of Illinois law
as to personalty having situs in Illinois); N.Y. DECED. EsT. LAw § 47 (same); Yiannopoulos, supra note I, at 206: "Whenever the will does not violate superior policies of
the forum essential validity is governed by the law upholding the will•.• ,'' (International conflicts cases); Note, The Testator's Intention as a Factor in Determining
the Place of Probate of His Estate, 33 IND, L.J. 591, 599, 608 (1958); cf. Lanius v.
Fletcher, 100 Tex. 550, 101 S.W. 1076 (1907) (situs law applied to prevent dissolution
of trust by beneficiary under law of domicile).
In regard to formal validity, many states have statutes alternatively referring to
the law of the place of execution or the law of domicile at time of execution. See
Model Execution of Wills Act, superseding Uniform Wills Act, Foreign Executed,
9A U.L.A. 341, § 7; RESTATAMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAws § 306, comment f
(Tent. Draft No. 5, 1959); Rees, American Wills Statutes, 46 VA. L. REv. 856, 905·06
(1960) (listing thirty-two states with statutes making some alternative reference for
formal validity).
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A. An Illustrative Case-In re Annesley48

I. Facts
Mrs. Annesley died in France in 1924, having lived there since
moving from England in 1866. She left two wills, a holographic
will in French and a will in English form. There was also a codicil
to the latter. In these wills, Mrs. Annesley purported to dispose of
all of her personal property in France and in England. This was
permissible under English law, but, if French law were applicable,
she could dispose by will of only one-third of her personal property,
and the rest would go to her two surviving daughters. In a contest
over distribution of the personal property in England (consisting
chiefly of two bank accounts) the daughters, who had received less
than two-thirds of the property disposed of by the wills, contended
that French law was applicable; the other legatees argued tor
English law.

2. Decision
The court, applying the domicile-at-death choice of law rule,
began by deciding that Mrs. Annesley had acquired a domicile of
choice in France, even though she had not taken the steps prescribed
for obtaining a formal French domicile40 by Article 13 of the French
Civil Code and had declared in her English-form will and a codicil
to it that it was not her intention to abandon her English domicile
of origin. For purposes of the English choice of law rule, "domicile"
would be defined by English standards.r;o Immediately, however,
the English court ran into another difficulty. The English choice
of law rule would refer to French law in this case, but what French
law-French domestic internal law only or the whole law of France
including its conflicts rules? This was important because, in the
case of a foreigner not legally domiciled in France according to the
French Code, the French choice of law rule would select the law of
that person's nationality-here, British law. Speaking for the majority of the court, Judge Russell applied the whole law of France,
although he himself would have preferred the other alternative.151
48. [1926] Ch. 692.

49. But see

DELAUME, AMERICAN-FRENCH PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LA.w 74-75 (2d ed.
1961) ("an alien residing in France with the appropriate intent could acquire a
de facto domicile in France, a notion substantially equivalent to the general concept
of domicile'1·
50. [1926] Ch. at 705.
51. Id. at 708-09.
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The method chosen for applying the whole law of France was
for the English court to decide the case just as a French court
would have. After hearing expert testimony on this subject, the court
decided that a French court would refer to English law, including
the English choice of law rule pointing back to France, would accept
this reference .back (renvoi), and would apply French internal law
to determine the validity of the testamentary disposition. 52 Thus
Mrs. Annesley's wills were invalid insofar as they undertook to
dispose of more than one-third of her personalty, and the legacies
of the personalty in England under the will in English form could
not be paid in full.

3. Analysis
This is all wonderfully complex and interesting. The only
difficulty is that it makes no sense whatever and the result is wrong. 53
The intent of the testatrix was known; it was, as expressed in her
wills, to leave the bulk of her estate to persons and institutions
other than her two daughters. England had no policy against giving
effect to this intention, and English law permitted testamentary
disposition of an entire estate. Did France have any logically applicable policy against giving effect to this intent? There was such
a French policy in regard to persons "domiciled" in France in the
French sense. But is not the French choice of law rule an indication
that the French policy, as interpreted by the French courts, is
inapplicable to this very testatrix? Why should an English court
enforce a French limitation on the intent of the testatrix when the
French courts themselves would not have enforced it but for the
English reference to French law?54 It is gauche to be more Roman
52. Cf. In re Schneider's Estate, 198 Misc. 1017, 96 N.Y.S.2d 652, adhered to, 100
N.Y.S.2d 371 (Surr. Ct. 1950) (applying whole law of situs to determine validity of
devise of realty); In re Zietz's Estate, 198 Misc. 77, 96 N.Y.S.2d 442 (Surr. Ct. 1950)
(situs accepts reference by law of domicile to law of nationality); Simmons v. Simmons,
17 N.S.W. St. 419 (1917) (reference to whole law of domicile in intestacy with opposite
view of that taken in principal case as to French rule on renvoi). For the very ques•
tionable use of the renvoi device to resolve a question of will construction, see In re
Duke of Wellington, [1947] Ch. 506. This case is aptly criticized in Mann, Succession
to Immovables Abroad, 11 MODERN L. REv. 232 (1948). For a case rejecting reference
to the whole foreign law but reaching a result which should have been reached by
construction alone, see Matter of Tallmadge, 109 Misc. 696, 181 N.Y.S. 336 (Surr. Ct.
1919).
53. For a case fortuitously reaching the right result by the same device because the
Italian conflicts rule referred back to only the internal law of the "nationality,"
which the court took to mean the last but no longer continuing American domicile,
see Taormina v. Taormina Corp., 35 Del. Ch. 17, 109 A.2d 400 (1954).
54. Counsel for the parties entitled to a trust legacy made a similar argument in
the principal case. "The origin of the rule that the law of the domicil governs the
succession to movables is based on convenience and international courtesy. The rule
is satisfied as soon as it is found that the law of the domicil rejects the propositus,
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than the Romans, but to be more French than the French is downright sinful.
The reason the English court fell into error was that, in adopting
the renvoi device and placing itself in the position of a French
court, it assumed that achieving uniformity of decision and thus
insulating the result from change by the selection of a forum was
the sole goal of choice of law rules. This is a goal, but only a
secondary or subsidiary one. The primary goal is to apply the law
which best takes into account the interests of the contact states and
the intentions of the parties. As a first step in conflicts analysis, the
court should determine whether there is any real conflict represented
by the differing domestic laws-whether the contact states have
applicable policies pointing to different results. If there is such a
real conflict, the court should attempt to provide a rational solution,
perhaps by looking to shared policies and general, shared trends in
the underlying substantive area. It is only when this primary analysis
is exhausted without success by a non-neutral forum 55-when there
is a real conflict which does not lend itself to rational solution or
when neither state has an interest in having its law applied but one
or the other must be applied56-that the sole focus is properly on
insulating the result from the selection of the forum. When this is
the proper focus, the "sitting-and-judging" formula with the forum
court placing itself in the position of the foreign court and deciding
the case exactly as the foreign court would have is the place to begin. This technique will not wor~ if the foreign court would also
employ it, since an endless circle of references will result unless
there is some natural terminus on which both jurisdictions can
agree, such as "the more probable forum."r. 7 It also will not work
if there is more than one foreign contact state and the courts in
those states would reach results diverse from one another and
diverse from the forum. Only at this point-when rational solution
of the conflict in terms of substantive policies and procedural
and then both on grounds of convenience and courtesy an English court will apply
English law." (1926] Ch. at 700.
55. If the forum has no applicable policy of its own and justice to the parties
does not permit dismissal under a doctrine of forum non conveniens, the neutral
forum should probably mirror a result that would be reached in common by all
interested states. See Cheatham &: Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 CoLUM.
L. REv. 959, 969 (1952).
56. See Weintraub, A Method for Solving Conflict Problems, 21 U. PITl'. L. REv'.
573, 589 (1960). But see Currie, Survival of Actions-Adjudication Versus Automation
in the Conflict of Laws, lO STAN. L. REv. 205, 228-29 (1958).
57. Cf. Freund, Characterization With Respect to Contracts in the Conflict of Laws,
in THE CONFLicr OF LAws AND INTERNATIONAL CoNTRACTS 158, 161 (1951).
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attempts to insulate the result from the selection of the forum have
both failed-has the time come to apply the rationally applicable
law most convenient for and most in consonance with the domestic
policies of the forum. Except in the case of a neutral forum without
sufficient contacts with the parties or with the transaction to keep
application of its law within the bounds of reason,118 this will be the
forum law.
B. A More Useful Approach

A conflicts case involving the essential validity of a will presents
a problem too complex to be solved by any rigid, territorially
oriented choice of law rule in the standard mold. This is true
whether we use "domicile" or "situs" or any other jurisdictionselector as the contact word. The number of different rules under
which a will might be declared invalid is very great, and the policies
which underlie these rules are quite diverse. In such a situation,
when one state having a contact with the parties or the property
would invalidate a will and another with such a contact would
uphold it, the way to begin is by focusing on the domestic laws in
apparent conflict and on the policies underlying those laws.110 In
light of those policies and those contacts, does only one of the
states have a rational interest in having its policies and its law
applied? If so, there is no true conflict and the law of that state
should be applied. If, on the other hand, several states have legitimate concerns for having their diverse rules on validity applied,
a real conflict is present and a rational solution for it should be
sought. Perhaps the general direction for resolution of a true conflict concerning the essential validity of a will should be toward
validation.60 It is likely, at least as between states of the United
States, that the difference in the laws will be one of detail rather
than basic policy; for example, one state may have a "two lives"
perpetuities rule and another a "lives in being" rule. The states
will share a general policy of upholding the intention of the
testator, an invalidating rule being an exception carved out of this
general policy. 61 If, however, the difference in laws is basic and
58. See Weintraub, Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Limitations on a
State's Choice of Law, 44 IowA L. REv. 449, 450-68, 490 (1959).
59. See STUMBERG, op. cit. supra note 13, at 377: "The problem is primarily one
of ascertaining the policy or purpose behind a particular prohibition and then giving
it effect."
60. Cf. Yiannopoulos, Wills of Movables in American International Conflicts Law
-A Critique of the Domiciliary "Rule," 46 CALIF. L. REv. 185, 206, 262 (1958).
61. Cf. Weintraub, The Contracts Proposals of the Second Restatement of Conflict
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the equities for validation are weak, perhaps both states would
agree that invalidation is the proper resolution of the conflict.
A further illustration may be helpful. Let us suppose a case
in which a testator, who was a long-term resident of state X, as
were all the natural objects of his bounty, dies in X bequeathing
personalty located in state Y to a Y charity, which conducts its
activities only in Y. I£ all contacts had been in Y the will would
have failed, at least in part, because the will was executed closer
to the time of death than is permitted by Y law for bequests to
charities. If all contacts had been in X, the bequest would have
failed because it gave the charity property in a greater amount
than charities are permitted to take under X law.
On the surface, there appears to be no real conflict, except
perhaps as to the degree of invalidity, and it appears that the bequest
should fail. But appearances may be deceiving. Let us assume, 62 for
the purposes of illustrative analysis, that the only policy underlying the Y time limit on bequests to charities is the protection of
the decedent and next of kin from death-bed decisions prompted
by solicitations or late-coming religious fervor. Let us similarly
suppose that the only purpose of the X statute is to prevent local
charities from becoming too powerful and to protect the local
economy by limiting the amount of property that can be taken out
of commercial use. 63 If so, then on these facts X has no interest in
applying its invalidating rule and neither has Y. Both X and Y have
a general policy of giving effect to the intention of the testator, and
this general policy should be effectuated in the posited case no
matter which state is the forum.

III.

CAPACITY OF A WIFE

To SuE

HER HusBAND

FOR NEGLIGENCE

A. Illustrative Cases

I. Haumschild v. Continental Cas. Co. 6~
This case produced the rule that a wife's capacity to sue her husband for negligence is determined by the law of the marital domiof Laws-A Critique, 46 IowA L. REY. 71!1, 714-16 (1961) (resolution of true conflict
concerning validity of contract).
62. A limit on the amount charities can take will, to some extent, protect heirs,
and protection of heirs will, to some extent, limit the amount taken by charities.
6!1. For an early non-conflicts case pointing out the differences in types and
policies of such statutes, see Trustees of Amherst College v. Ritch, 151 N.Y. 282, 45
N.E. 876 (1897). For a masterly treatment of the problem, see Hancock, In the Parish
of St. Mary le Bow, in the Ward of Cheap, 16 STAN. L. REv. 561 (1964).
64. 7 Wis. 2d 1!10, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959).
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cile. While a husband and wife, domiciled in Wisconsin, were driving in California, the wife was injured by the husband's negligence.
Under Wisconsin law, but not under California law at that time,
a wife could sue her husband for such negligent injury. Overruling
a long line of Wisconsin cases65 and abandoning the "place of
wrong" rule in this context, the Wisconsin court permitted the wife
to sue her husband and his liability insurer. The reason given was
that this was a problem of family law and not tort law and therefore
was governed by the law of the marital domicile rather than that
of the place of ·wrong.
This kind of label-switching, not based on analysis of the policies
underlying the apparently conflicting state law, is arbitrary and unconvincing. Furthermore, devoid as it is of proper analysis of substantive policies, it runs the risk of creating as many spurious
conflicts as did the rule it replaced. In Haumschild the result, fortuitously, happened to be correct. It was correct because Wisconsin
had an obvious interest in permitting the wife to recover and
California's rule preventing suit applied only to California husbands
and wives. The reason for the California rule was that, since California is a community property state, the defendant husband would
share in the fruits of his wrongdoing if the wife recovered. The disability of California wives to sue their husbands for negligence was
terminated as soon as the community property law was amended so
that the husband would not share in the recovery. 66

2. Haynie v. Hanson 67
In another Wisconsin case applying the domicile rule, however,
a spurious conflict was generated and the result was wrong. In
Haynie an Illinois husband and wife were driving in Wisconsin
when the wife, Mrs. Haynie, was injured in a collision with an automobile driven by Mr. Hanson. The wife sued Mr. Hanson and his
liability insurer in Wisconsin. At all relevant times, Mr. Hanson
was a citizen of Wisconsin and his liability insurer was a Wisconsin
company. 68 The defendants attempted to implead the Illinois hus65. E.g., Buckeye v. Buckeye, 203 Wis. 248, 234 N.W. 342 (1931).
66. Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 376 P.2d 70 (1962). For a case reaching the
Haumschild result, but on the basis of policies underlying the competing rules, see
Thompson v. Thompson, 105 N.H. 86, 193 A.2d 439 (1963). In California, a wife's
cause of action even before Klein was not community property if it arose in California
between spouses domiciled in noncommunity property states. Bruton v. Villoria, 138
Cal. App. 2d 642, 292 P.2d 638 (1956).
67. 16 Wis. 2d 299, 114 N.W.2d 443 (1962).
68. Brief for Appellant, p. l 1.
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band's liability insurer on the ground that the husband's negligence
made him liable for contribution. The cross-complaint was dismissed
on the ground that under Illinois law a wife could not sue her husband for negligence and, applying the Haumschild marital domicile
choice of law rule, there was no underlying liability on which to
base contribution. This is wrong. Wisconsin had an interest in permitting the Wisconsin defendants to obtain contribution and had no
policy against wives suing husbands. The policies possibly underlying the Illinois incapacity rule-prevention of marital discord and
fear of collusive suits-were not rationally applicable when the wife
was suing not her husband, but third parties, in a Wisconsin forum. 69

B. The Harm of the Domicile Concept in this Context
Aside from generating false conflicts in the contribution situation, the domicile-centered rule for determining the wife's capacity
to sue may disguise a real conflict and prevent its rational solution.
Even if a suit against the husband is forbidden by the law of the
domicile, another state may have a very significant interest in permitting recovery. This would be true, for example, if the accident
happened in a state which permitted such suits, the wife was seriously injured and under intensive treatment there, there were unpaid medical creditors, and the wife was a public charge. Under
such circumstances, if suit is brought at the place of injury and the
main concern of the domicile is the prevention of collusive suits,
perhaps the conflict should be resolved in favor of permitting recovery.
Thus, once again, a domicile-centered choice of law rule generates false problems and interferes with the rational solution of true
problems. 70

IV. A

CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR JUDICIAL JURISDICTION

Domicile within a state is a recognized constitutional basis for
in personam jurisdiction,71 provided notice and opportunity to be
heard that are reasonable under the circumstances are given.72 But
69. Cf. Lachance v. Service Trucking Co., 215 F. Supp. 162 (D. Md. 1963) (permits
joinder of husband on analysis similar to that above; but query whether the place of
impact had interest in permitting contribution except as place where defendant company transacted some business).
70. For a fuller discussion, see Weintraub, A Method for Solving Conflict Problems
-Torts, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 215, 216-20 (1963).
71. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
72. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917).
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is mere technical domicile within a state always sufficient for this
purpose?
A Illustrative Cases

I. Alvord &- Alvord v. Patenotre18
In this case substituted service based on the defendant's domicile within the state was made five days after the defendant had left
the state intending to establish a domicile of choice in Switzerland.
At the time of service, defendant had not yet arrived in Switzerland;
so, lacking the necessary physical presence, he had not yet established
his domicile there. This being so, under the technical concept of
domicile, he retained his former domicile in New York, and a
motion to vacate the order for substituted service was denied.
The core concept in satisfying the due process demands for
judicial jurisdiction is one of reasonableness. In the great majority
of cases, domicile within a state is likely to provide a constitutional
basis for in personam jurisdiction because it is reasonable to require
domiciliaries who are temporarily absent from the state to appear
and defend under penalty of having their rights adjudicated by default. In the Patenotre case, the passage of only five days and the
fact that during that time the defendant would not likely be subject
to suit anywhere else may have made the result reasonable. But suppose we extend the period of defendant's sojourn to his new domicile to a year or more, during which time he was undecided where to
make his new home. AU his property has been removed from his
former home state and he has severed all other connections with it.
Assuming no other basis for personal jurisdiction over the defendant,
is his technical domicile there enough to answer due process objections to an attempt to assert such jurisdiction over him? One would
hope not. 74
73. 196 Misc. 524, 92 N.Y.S.2d 514 (1949).
74. But see REsrATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLicr OF LAws, Explanatory note § 79. at 70
(Tent. Draft No. 3, 1956): "The position is taken in this Section that domicil in a
state provides a sufficient basis of judicial jurisdiction even though the individual's
contacts with the state are slight and his domicil there of a technical nature. This is
because (1) everyone should be subject to suit in at least one state without actually
being present there at the time of service and (2) a person will normally be more
closely connected with the state of his domicil than with any other." As support for
this statement there is cited the following passage from McDonald v. Mabee, 248
U.S. 90, 92 (1917): "When the former suit was begun, Mabee, although technically
domiciled in Texas, had left the state, intending to establish his home elsewhere.
Perhaps in view of his technical position and the actual presence of his family in
the state, a summons left at his last and usual place of abode would have been
enough." (Emphasis added.) If this passage supports anything, it would seem to support a position contrary to that taken by the second Restatement.
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2. Lea v. Lea75

This case presents another example of how losing sight of the
core concept of reasonableness and focusing on technical domicile
may hinder rational analysis in matters of judicial jurisdiction. A
woman domiciled in New Jersey was attempting to enforce an alimony award which had been included in a divorce decree obtained
against her former husband in New York. The former husband,
also presently domiciled in New Jersey, contended that the alimony
award was void because the New York court did not have in personam jurisdiction over him. The New York court had based its jurisdiction on the husband's domicile in New York, although in fact,
at the time of the wife's divorce in New York, the husband was
living in Louisiana with another woman. He had been living and
working in Louisiana for several years and had clearly established
a domicile of choice there when he moved into that state with his
wife and son. He had, however, sent his wife and son from Louisiana to New York to be with his mother who was dying. The husband came to New York for his mother's funeral but returned to
Louisiana, leaving his wife and child in New York. Suspicious of
her husband's continued insistence that she stay in New York, the
wife went to Louisiana, learned that her. husband had secured a
purported divorce in Arkansas, and then returned to New York to
file suit for divorce. The Supreme Court of New Jersey upheld the
New York alimony decree based on the husband's domicile in New
York, saying: "Even conceding that the appellant has never been
in the State of New York, except to pass through, since 1942, he
was under a paramount duty to supply a home for his wife and
child and such a home was established at his direction, insecure as
it was, in New York. We, therefore, conclude that the family domicile and the domicile of the appellant was in the State of New
York.•• .''78
New York probably had a constitutional basis for personal jurisdiction over the absent husband, since he had sent his wife and
child into the state and they were there with a right to his support.
He caused these consequences in New York and should be subject
to the jurisdiction of a New York court in an action growing out
75. 18 N.J. 1, 112 A.2d 540 (1955).
76. Id. at 11, 112 A.2d at 545. Cf. Bangs v. Inhabitants of Brewster, Ill Mass. 882
(187!1) (domicile of choice established by wife's presence while husband at sea). But cf.
Mdntosh v. Maricopa County, 78 Ariz. !166,,241 P.2d 801 (1952) (wife's presence while
husband in armed forces did not establish husband's domicile of choice).
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of them. 77 Having a constitutional basis for jurisdiction, absent
any outrageous surprise to the husband, the New York courts were
probably free to stretch their domiciliary service statute to cover the
situation as other courts have stretched "doing business" statutes.78
But we should not be so caught up in this play acting that we believe
for a moment that the husband was "domiciled" in New York and
that this was the basis for jurisdiction.
To test this proposition, suppose one of the husband's Louisiana
creditors had moved to New York and then discovered that he had
forgotten to collect a sum the husband owed him. Having learned of
the wife's action in New York and the finding of domicile by the
New York court, the creditor sues the husband in New York using
the provision for substituted service on domiciliaries. It is submitted that there is no constitutional basis for in personam jurisdiction over the husband in the creditor's suit. 79

B. A Substitute for Domicile as a Basis for
Judicial Jurisdiction
Just as technical domicile alone should not suffice as a constitutional basis for personal jurisdiction when measured against the
core concept of reasonableness, it would seem that in view of this
same reasonableness standard, technical domicile, despite United
States Supreme Court dicta to the contrary, 80 should not be a constitutional prerequisite for divorce jurisdiction.81 What is necessary
for divorce jurisdiction is some contact between the forum and the
marriage to give that forum a reasonable interest in affecting the
marital status. The servicemen's divorce statutes and the opinions
upholding their validity seem proper by such a test. 82 The serviceman's substantial period of residence in the state while stationed
77. See R.EsTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFUCT OF LAWS § 84 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1956).
78. See Roy v. North Am. Alliance, Inc., 205 A.2d 844 (N.H. 1964); Note, Recent
Interpretations of "Doing Business" Statutes, 44 IowA L. REv. 345 (1959).
79. Cf. COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFUCT OF LAws 199 (1942)
(although the court in Winans v. Winans, 205 Mass. 388, 91 N.E. 394 (1910), found
husband domiciled in Massachusetts for purpose of wife's divorce jurisdiction, Cook
does not think there would be a similar finding for personal jurisdiction in a cause
of action not related to the marriage).
80. See, e.g., Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945): "Under our
system of law, judicial power to grant a divorce-jurisdiction, strictly speaking-is
founded on domicil."
81. See Note, Domidle as a Constitutional Requirement for Divorce Jurisdiction, 44
IOWA L. R.Ev. 765 (1959).
82. See, e.g., Lauterbach v. Lauterbach, 392 P.2d 24 (Alaska 1964); Craig v. Craig,
143 Kan. 624, 56 P.2d 464 (1936); Wood v. Wood, 159 Tex. 350, 320 S.W.2d 807 (1959).
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there, which the statutes require, 83 seems to afford the state where
he is serving a legitimate interest in affecting his marital status although, because of his obligation to obey orders and the nomadic
nature of service life, he could not ordinarily have the state of
mind required to establish a technical domicile of choice in that
state. 8¼
V.

THE SUGGESTION THAT WE SHOULD RETAIN "DOMICILE"
AS A TOOL FOR CONFLICTS ANALYSIS BUT RECOGNIZE
THAT ITS MEANING CHANGES WITH THE CONTEXT

In the famous debate during the proceedings of the American
Law Institute concerning the adoption of the provisions of the first
Restatement of the Conflict of Laws on domicile, Professor Walter
Wheeler Cook advanced the following proposition concerning the
meaning of that term: "There is no doubt that what you might call
the core of the concept is the same in all these situations; but as you
get out towards what I like to call the twilight zone of the subject,
I don't believe the scope remains exactly the same for all pur83. An exception is the Alabama statute which requires no period of residence.
Au. CODE tit. 7, § 96(1) (1958): "Any person in any branch or service of the government of the United States of America, including those in the military, air and
naval service, and the husband or wife of any such person, if he or she be living
within the borders of the State of Alabama shall be deemed to be a resident of the
State of Alabama for the purpose of maintaining any suit or action at law or in
equity in the courts of this State." Furthermore, the Alabama divorce statute requires
a period of residence (one year) only if the divorce is ex parte and only if the
defendant is not a resident. ALA. CoDE tit. 34, § 29 (1958). The validity of the Alabama
servicemen's residence statute would, therefore, seem highly doubtful in divorce cases.
It was, however, upheld in a case in which the plaintiff serviceman had actually lived
in Alabama for almost two years. Conrad v. Conrad, 275 Ala. 202, 153 So. 2d 635 (1963).
84. See, e.g., Hammerstein v. Hammerstein, 269 S.W.2d 591 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
But see Slade v. Slade, 122 N.W.2d 160 (N.D. 1963); Sasse v. Sasse, 41 Wash. 2d 363,
249 P.2d 380 (1952).
The second Restatement draws a distinction between soldiers who must live on
post and those who may live off post. REsrATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAws § 21,
comment d (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954): "A soldier or sailor, if he is ordered to a
station to which he must go and live in quarters assigned to him, cannot acquire a
domicil there though he lives in the assigned quarters with his family • • . . On the
other hand, if he is allowed to live with his family where he pleases provided it is
near enough to his post to enable him to perform his duty, he retains some power
of choice over the place of his abode and can acquire a domicil." Query whether
an irrebuttable presumption that a serviceman living on post cannot acquire a
domicile of choice in the state is a sufficiently reasonable classification to withstand
attack under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Cf. Carrington
v. Rash, 85 Sup. Ct. 775 (1965) (Texas constitutional provision preventing servicemen
from acquiring a voting residence in Texas a violation of equal protection); Newman
v. Graham, 82 Idaho 90, 349 P.2d 716 (1960) (Idaho Board of Education regulation
preventing nonresident students from acquiring resident status for purposes of tuition
is arbitrary and unreasonable).
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poses."85 This was too much for Professor Beale, the Reporter, and
his vested rights allies to swallow, since it would upset the symmetry
of the tight little syllogisms that they were fashioning and that imprisoned conflicts analysis for the better part of three decades. At
least for now, however, the verdict of history has gone to Professor
Cook, for the second Restatement adopts substantially his position.86
It, of course, cannot be otherwise. The domiciliary concept is
used for too many diverse purposes; the finding of domicile is too
dependent upon subjective inferences drawn from the facts, even undisputed facts, 87 for the meaning of that concept not to vary with
its context.88 For this same reason, the proposition that the meaning
of "domicile" shifts with the circumstances would be difficult or
impossible to prove by case analysis. Articulating the same technical
definition of "domicile," courts can shift its meaning subtly by
shifting the emphasis to one or another element of the definition or
by drawing different reasonable inferences from essentially the same
fact pattern.89
The point, however, is that the common-sense recognition that
the meaning of "domicile" must shift with the use to which it is
put, is not enough to preserve it as a viable and useful tool for
conflicts analysis, especially as a contact word in choice of law rules.
It is true that an able and enlightened court, utilizing the flexibility
inherent in the term, can reach proper results in individual cases.
This is not impossible, but neither is it very easy or likely. It is
like retaining "place of wrong" as the basic choice of law rule for
torts and attempting to achieve just and rational results by varying
85. 3 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN !..AW INSTITUTE 227 (1925).
86. REsrATEMENT {SECOND), CONFUCT OF LAws § 11, comment d (Tent. Draft No.
2, 1954).
87. The classic example is the Dorrance litigation in which, from essentially undis•
puted facts, Mr. Dorrance was found domiciled in both New Jersey and Pennsylvania
at death and double inheritance taxes were levied. In re Dorrance, 115 N.J. Eq. 268,
170 Atl. 601 (Prerogative Ct. 1934), aff'd mem., 13 N.J. Misc. 168, 176 Atl. 902 (Sup.
Ct. 1935), afj'd mem., II6 N.JL. 362, 184 Atl. 743, cert. denied, 298 U.S. 678 (1936);
Dorrance's Estate, 309 Pa. 151, 163 Atl. 303, cert. denied, 288 U.S. 617 (1932).
88. See STOMBERG, CoNFUCT OF I..Aws 48 (3d ed. 1963); Reese, supra note 43, at 592;
Yiannopoulos, supra note 60, at 259 n.378. For a classic judicial statement of the
opposing viewpoint, see Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.S. 619, 625 (1914) (Holmes, J.):
"The very meaning of domicil is the technically preeminent headquarters that every
person is compelled to have in order that certain rights and duties that have been
attached to it by the law may be determined •••• In its nature it is one, and if in
any case two are recognized for different purposes it is a doubtful anomaly."
89. Cf. REsrATEMENT {SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAws § 21, comment d (Tent. Draft
No. 2, 1954).
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the meaning of "place of wrong" 90 or by characterization legerdemain. 01
One of the crowning glories of the new Restatement is that it
has abandoned the "place of ·wrong" rule for torts. 92 There is no
justification for retaining any rigid, territorially-oriented choice of
law rule which utilizes contact words pointing to a place rather
than focusing attention on the reasonable interests of contact states.93
If the result in In re Estate of ]ones94 is wrong, the error does not
lie in fixing Evan Jones' technical domicile at death in Iowa. It is
wrong because Great Britain had an interest in controlling the distribution of Evan's intestate personalty as between his illegitimate
daughter and his brothers and sisters; Iowa did not. If the result
in White v. Tennant 05 is wrong, it is wrong because it fails to advance West Virginia's legitimate interests in having its own law
applied, not because Michael White was domiciled at death in West
Virginia. So, too, if the holding in In re Annesley96 is incorrect, it is
because it employs the French rule frustrating the intention of the
testatrix when the French rule is not relevant.
If it is desirable in these cases to manipulate the meaning of
"domicile" so that Evan Jones will be domiciled at death in Great
Britain, or Michael White in West Virginia, or Mrs. Annesley in
England, it is because of reasons revealed by an analysis of the
policies underlying the apparently conflicting domestic rules con90. Cases involving harm to the incidents of marriage have sometimes applied the
law of the marital domicile rather than the law of the place where the defendant
acts. Albert v. McGrath, 278 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (alienation of affections); Orr
v. Sasseman, 239 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1956) (alienation of affections); Gordon v. Parker,
83 F. Supp. 40 (D. Mass), afj'd, 178 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1949) (alienation of affections).
For cases rejecting the argument that the harm occurred at the marital domicile, see
Sestito v. Knop, 297 F.2d 33 (7th Cir. 1961) (loss of consortium); Jordan v. States
Marine Corp., 257 F.2d 232 (9th Cir. 1958) (loss of consortium); McVickers v. Chesapeake &: O. Ry., 194 F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Mich. 1961) (loss of consortium). But cf.
Lister v. McAnulty, [1944] Can. Sup. Ct. 317, [1944] 3 D.L.R. 673 (law of marital
domicile applied to prevent husband's recovery for loss of consortium).
91. See, e.g., Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133,
172 N.E.2d 526 (1961) ("procedural''); Haumschild v. Continental Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d
130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959) ("family law''); Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d
944 (1953) ("administration of estates," "procedural'').
92. REsTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LA.ws § 379 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963).
93. As an indication that allowing the meaning of domicile to vary with context
will not produce satisfactory results, Professor Cook, one of the champions of the
flexible meaning view, cites with approval for its awareness of the problem In Te
Jones' Estate (see text accompanying notes 21-33 supra). CooK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL
BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAws 196 n.3 (1942).
94. See text accompanying notes 21-33 supra.
95. See text accompanying notes 34-45 supra.
96. See text accompanying notes 48-54 supa.
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ceming intestate succession or validity of wills. Without such an
analysis, manipulation of the meaning of "domicile" is unreasoned
and blind and, therefore, unwise. With such an analysis, molding
"domicile" to fit our needs is unnecessary. It is unnecessary because,
having made the analysis, we can base the result directly upon the
relevance or irrelevance of the domestic policies in issue and need
not, therefore should not, speak of "domicile" at all. The time has
come to bury the albatross.

